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PROSPECT THEORY:  AN ANALYSIS  OF DECISION  UNDER  RISK 
BY DANIEL  KAHNEMAN  AND  AMOS  TVERSKY' 
This paper presents  a critique of  expected  utility theory  as a descriptive  model  of 
decision making under risk, and develops  an alternative model, called prospect theory. 
Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with 
the basic tenets  of utility theory.  In particular, people  underweight outcomes  that are 
merely probable  in comparison with outcomes  that are obtained  with certainty. This 
tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure 
gains and to risk seeking  in choices involving sure losses.  In addition, people  generally 
discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, 
called  the  isolation  effect,  leads  to  inconsistent  preferences  when  the  same  choice  is 
presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed,  in which value 
is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are 
replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly 
convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are 
generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except  in the range of low prob- 
abilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both 
insurance and gambling. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
EXPECTED  UTILITY  THEORY  has dominated the analysis of decision making under 
risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice [24], 
and widely  applied as a descriptive model  of  economic  behavior,  e.g.  [15, 4]. 
Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the 
theory [47, 36], and that most people actually do, most of the time. 
The  present  paper  describes  several  classes  of  choice  problems  in  which 
preferences systematically violate  the axioms of expected  utility theory. In the 
light  of  these  observations  we  argue  that  utility  theory,  as  it  is  commonly 
interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an 
alternative account of choice under risk. 
2.  CRITIQUE 
Decision  making under risk can be viewed  as a choice between  prospects or 
gambles. A prospect (x1, Pi; ...  ; xn,  pn)  is a contract that yields outcome xi with 
probability Pi, where  Pl  + P2 +  ...  + pn =  1. To  simplify notation,  we  omit  null 
outcomes  and use (x, p) to denote  the prospect (x, p; 0, 1-  p) that yields x with 
probability p  and 0 with probability 1-p.  The (riskless) prospect that yields x 
with certainty is denoted by (x). The present discussion is restricted to prospects 
with so-called objective or standard probabilities. 
The application of expected utility theory to choices between prospects is based 
on the following three tenets. 
(i) Expectation:  U(X1,  Pi;  ...  ; Xn,  Pn)  =  pi u (x1)  +...  +PnU  (Xn) 
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That is, the overall utility of a prospect, denoted by U, is the expected utility of 
its outcomes. 
(ii) Asset  Integration: (xi, Pi; ...  ; Xn,  P)  is acceptable at asset position  w iff 
U(w +x1, pl; ...  ; w +Xn, Pn)  > u(w). 
That is, a prospect is acceptable  if the utility resulting from integrating the 
prospect  with one's  assets exceeds  the  utility of  those  assets alone.  Thus, the 
domain of the utility function is final states (which include one's asset position) 
rather than gains or losses. 
Although the domain of the utility function is not limited to any particular class 
of  consequences,  most  applications  of  the  theory  have  been  concerned  with 
monetary  outcomes.  Furthermore,  most  economic  applications  introduce  the 
following additional assumption. 
(iii) Risk Aversion:  u is concave (u"  < 0). 
A person is risk averse if he prefers the certain prospect (x) to any risky prospect 
with expected value x. In expected utility theory, risk aversion is equivalent to the 
concavity of the utility function. The prevalence of risk aversion is perhaps the 
best  known  generalization  regarding risky choices.  It  led  the  early  decision 
theorists of the eighteenth century to propose that utility is a concave function of 
money, and this idea has been retained in modern treatments (Pratt [33], Arrow 
[4]). 
In the following  sections  we demonstrate  several phenomena  which violate 
these  tenets  of  expected  utility theory.  The  demonstrations  are based  on  the 
responses of students and university faculty to hypothetical choice problems. The 
respondents were presented with problems of the type illustrated below. 
Which of the following would you prefer? 
A:  50% chance to win 1,000,  B: 450 for sure. 
50% chance to win nothing; 
The  outcomes  refer to  Israeli currency. To  appreciate  the  significance of  the 
amounts involved, note that the median net monthly income for a family is about 
3,000  Israeli pounds.  The  respondents  were  asked to  imagine that they were 
actually faced  with  the  choice  described  in the  problem,  and to  indicate  the 
decision they would have made in such a case. The responses were anonymous, 
and the instructions specified that there was no 'correct' answer to such problems, 
and that the aim of the study was to find out how people  choose  among risky 
prospects. The problems were presented  in questionnaire form, with at most a 
dozen  problems  per  booklet.  Several  forms of  each  questionnaire  were  con- 
structed so that subjects were exposed  to the problems in different orders. In 
addition, two versions of each problem were used in which the left-right position 
of the prospects was reversed. 
The problems described in this paper are selected  illustrations of a series of 
effects.  Every  effect  has  been  observed  in  several  problems  with  different 
outcomes  and probabilities. Some of the problems have also been presented to 
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University  of  Michigan. The pattern of results was essentially  identical to the 
results obtained from Israeli subjects. 
The reliance on hypothetical  choices  raises obvious  questions  regarding the 
validity of the method and the generalizability of the results. We are keenly aware 
of these problems. However, all other methods that have been used to test utility 
theory also suffer from severe drawbacks. Real choices can be investigated either 
in the field, by naturalistic or statistical observations of economic behavior, or in 
the laboratory. Field studies can only provide for rather crude tests of qualitative 
predictions, because probabilities and utilities cannot be adequately measured in 
such  contexts.  Laboratory  experiments  have  been  designed  to  obtain  precise 
measures of utility and probability from actual choices, but these experimental 
studies typically involve contrived gambles for small stakes, and a large number of 
repetitions  of  very  similar problems.  These  features  of  laboratory  gambling 
complicate the interpretation of the results and restrict their generality. 
By default, the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest pro- 
cedure by which a large number of theoretical questions can be investigated. The 
use of the method  relies on the assumption that people  often  know how they 
would behave in actual situations of choice, and on the further assumption that the 
subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences.  If people  are 
reasonably  accurate in predicting their choices,  the presence  of  common  and 
systematic violations of expected utility theory in hypothetical problems provides 
presumptive evidence against that theory. 
Certainty,  Probability, and Possibility 
In expected  utility theory,  the  utilities  of  outcomes  are weighted  by  their 
probabilities. The present section describes a series of choice problems in which 
people's  preferences  systematically  violate  this principle.  We  first show  that 
people  overweight  outcomes  that are considered  certain, relative to outcomes 
which are merely probable-a  phenomenon  which we label the certainty effect. 
The best known counter-example to expected utility theory which e*ploits the 
certainty effect was introduced by the French economist Maurice Allais in 1953 
[2].  Allais'  example  has been  discussed from both  normative  and descriptive 
standpoints by many authors [28, 38]. The following pair of choice problems is a 
variation of Allais'  example,  which differs from the original in that it refers to 
moderate rather than to extremely large gains. The number of respondents who 
answered each problem is denoted  by N, and the percentage who choose  each 
option is given in brackets. 
PROBLEM  1: Choose between 
A:  2,500 with probability  .33,  B:  2,400 with certainty. 
2,400 with probability  .66, 
0 with probability  .01; 
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PROBLEM  2: Choose between 
C:  2,500 with probability  .33,  D:  2,400  with probability  .34, 
0 with probability  .67;  0 with probability  .66. 
N =72  [83]*  [17] 
The data show that 82 per cent of the subjects chose B in Problem 1, and 83 per 
cent of the subjects chose C in Problem 2. Each of these preferences is significant 
at the .01 level, as denoted by the asterisk. Moreover, the analysis of individual 
patterns of choice indicates that a majority of respondents (61 per cent) made the 
modal choice  in both problems. This pattern of preferences  violates  expected 
utility theory  in the manner originally described by Allais.  According  to  that 
theory, with u (0) = 0, the first preference implies 
u(2,400)>  .33u(2,500)  + .66u(2,400)  or .34u(2,400)>  .33u(2,500) 
while the second preference implies the reverse inequality. Note that Problem 2 is 
obtained from Problem 1 by eliminating a .66 chance of winning 2400 from both 
prospects. under consideration. Evidently, this change produces a greater reduc- 
tion in desirability when it alters the character of the prospect from a sure gain to a 
probable  one,  than  when  both  the  original  and  the  reduced  prospects  are 
uncertain. 
A  simpler  demonstration  of  the  same  phenomenon,  involving  only  two- 
outcome gambles is given below. This example is also based on Allais [2]. 
PROBLEM  3: 
A:  (4,000,.80),  or  B:  (3,000). 
N = 95  [20]  [80]* 
PROBLEM  4: 
C:  (4,000,.20),  or  D:  (3,000,.25). 
N=  95  [65]*  [35] 
In this pair of problems as well as in all other problem-pairs in this section, over 
half the respondents violated  expected  utility theory. To show that the modal 
pattern of preferences in Problems 3 and 4 is not compatible with the theory, set 
u(0) =  0,  and  recall  that  the  choice  of  B  implies  u(3,000)/u(4,000)  >4/5, 
whereas the choice of  C implies the reverse inequality. Note  that the prospect 
C = (4,000,  .20) can be expressed as (A, .25), while the prospect D = (3,000,  .25) 
can be rewritten as (B,.25). The substitution axiom of utility theory asserts that if 
B is preferred to A, then any (probability) mixture (B, p) must be preferred to the 
mixture (A, p). Our subjects did not obey this axiom. Apparently, reducing the 
probability of winning from 1.0 to .25 has a greater effect than the reduction from PROSPECT  THEORY  267 
.8 to .2. The following pair of choice problems illustrates the certainty effect with 
non-monetary outcomes. 
PROBLEM  5: 
A:  50% chance to win a three-  B:  A  one-week  tour  of 
week  tour  of  England,  England, with certainty. 
France, and Italy; 
N=72  [22]  [78]* 
PROBLEM  6: 
C:  5%  chance  to  win  a three-  D:  10%  chance  to  win a one- 
week  tour  of  England,  week tour of England. 
France, and Italy; 
N=72  [67]*  [33] 
The certainty effect is not the only type of violation of the substitution axiom. 
Another situation in which this axiom fails is illustrated by the following problems. 
PROBLEM  7: 
A:  (6,000,  .45),  B:  (3,000,  .90). 
N = 66  [14]  [86]* 
PROBLEM  8: 
C:  (6,000,  .001),  D:  (3,000,  .002). 
N = 66  [73]*  [27] 
Note that in Problem 7 the probabilities of winning are substantial (.90 and .45), 
and most people choose the prospect where winning is more probable. In Problem 
8,  there  is a possibility of  winning,  although  the probabilities  of  winning are 
minuscule (.002  and .001)  in both prospects. In this situation where winning is 
possible but not probable, most people choose the prospect that offers the larger 
gain. Similar results have been reported by MacCrimmon and Larsson [28]. 
The above problems illustrate common  attitudes toward risk or chance that 
cannot  be  captured  by  the  expected  utility  model.  The  results  suggest  the 
following empirical generalization concerning the manner in which the substitu- 
tion axiom is violated. If (y, pq) is equivalent to (x, p), then (y, pqr) is preferred to 
(x, pr), 0<  p, q, r <  1. This property is incorporated into  an alternative theory, 
developed  in the second part of the paper. 268  D.  KAHNEMAN  AND  A.  TVERSKY 
The Reflection Effect 
The  previous section  discussed preferences  between  positive  prospects,  i.e., 
prospects that involve no losses. What happens when the signs of the outcomes are 
reversed so that gains are replaced by losses? The left-hand column of Table I 
displays four of the choice problems that were discussed in the previous section, 
and the right-hand column displays choice  problems in which the signs of the 
outcomes  are reversed. We use -x  to denote  the loss of x, and >  to denote the 
prevalent preference, i.e., the choice made by the majority of subjects. 
TABLE  I 
PREFERENCES  BETWEEN  POSITIVE  AND  NEGATIVE  PROSPECTS 
Positive prospects  Negative prospects 
Problem 3:  (4,000,  .80)  <  (3,000).  Problem 3':  (-4,000,  .80)  >  (-3,000). 
N=95  [20]  [80]*  N=95  [92]*  [8] 
Problem 4:  (4,000,  .20)  >  (3,000,  .25).  Problem 4':  (-4,000,  .20)  <  (-3,000,  .25). 
N=95  [65]*  [35]  N=95  [42]  [58] 
Problem 7:  (3,000,  .90)  >  (6,000,  .45).  Problem 7':  (-3,000,  .90)  <  (-6,000,  .45). 
N=66  [86]*  [14]  N=66  [8]  [92]* 
Problem 8:  (3,000,  .002)  <  (6,000,  .001).  Problem 8':  (-3,000,  .002)  >  (-6,000,  .001). 
N=66  [27]  [73]*  N=66  [70]*  [30] 
In each  of  the  four problems  in Table  I the  preference  between  negative 
prospects is the mirror image of the preference between positive prospects. Thus, 
the reflection of prospects around 0 reverses the preference order. We label this 
pattern the reflection  effect. 
Let us turn now to the implications of these data. First, note that the reflection 
effect implies that risk aversion in the positive  domain is accompanied by risk 
seeking  in the  negative  domain.  In Problem  3', for example,  the  majority of 
subjects were willing to accept a risk of .80 to lose 4,000,  in preference to a sure 
loss of 3,000,  although the gamble has a lower expected value. The occurrence of 
risk seeking in choices between negative prospects was noted early by Markowitz 
[29].  Williams [48]  reported data where a translation of outcomes  produces a 
dramatic shift from risk aversion to risk seeking. For example, his subjects were 
indifferent between (100,  .65;  -  100, .35) and (0), indicating risk aversion. They 
were also indifferent between (-200,  .80) and (-100),  indicating risk seeking. A 
recent review by Fishburn and Kochenberger [14] documents the prevalence of 
risk seeking in choices between negative prospects. 
Second, recall that the preferences between the positive prospects in Table I are 
inconsistent  with  expected  utility  theory.  The  preferences  between  the  cor- 
responding negative prospects also violate the expectation principle in the same 
manner. For example, Problems 3' and 4', like Problems 3 and 4, demonstrate that 
outcomes  which  are  obtained  with  certainty  are  overweighted  relative  to 
uncertain outcomes.  In the positive domain, the certainty effect contributes to a 
risk averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely probable. In 
the negative domain, the same effect leads to a risk seeking preference for a loss PROSPECT  THEORY  269 
that is merely probable over a smaller loss that is certain. The same psychological 
principle-the  overweighting of certainty-favors  risk aversion in the domain of 
gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. 
Third, the reflection effect eliminates aversion for uncertainty or variability as 
an  explanation  of  the  certainty  effect.  Consider,  for  example,  the  prevalent 
preferences for (3,000) over (4,000,  .80) and for (4,000,  .20) over (3,000,  .25). To 
resolve this apparent inconsistency one could invoke the assumption that people 
prefer prospects that have high expected value and small variance (see, e.g., Allais 
[2]; Markowitz [30]; Tobin [41]). Since (3,000) has no variance while (4,000,  .80) 
has large variance, the former prospect could be chosen despite its lower expected 
value.  When  the  prospects  are reduced,  however,  the  difference  in variance 
between  (3,000,.25)  and  (4,000,.20)  may  be  insufficient  to  overcome  the 
difference in expected  value. Because  (-3,000)  has both higher expected  value 
and lower  variance than  (-4,000,.80),  this account  entails  that the  sure loss 
should be preferred, contrary to the data. Thus, our data are incompatible with the 
notion  that  certainty  is  generally  desirable.  Rather,  it  appears that  certainty 
increases the aversiveness of losses as well as the desirability of gains. 
Probabilistic Insurance 
The prevalence of the purchase of insurance against both large and small losses 
has been  regarded by many as strong evidence  for the concavity of the utility 
function  for  money.  Why  otherwise  would  people  spend  so  much  money  to 
purchase insurance policies  at a price that exceeds  the expected  actuarial cost? 
However,  an  examination  of  the  relative  attractiveness  of  various  forms  of 
insurance does  not  support the  notion  that the  utility function  for  money  is 
concave everywhere. For example, people often prefer insurance programs that 
offer limited coverage with low or zero deductible over comparable policies that 
offer higher maximal coverage with higher deductibles-contrary  to risk aversion 
(see,  e.g.,  Fuchs [16]).  Another  type  of  insurance problem  in which people's 
responses  are inconsistent  with the  concavity hypothesis  may be  called prob- 
abilistic insurance. To  illustrate this concept,  consider the following  problem, 
which was presented to 95 Stanford University students. 
PROBLEM  9: Suppose you consider the possibility of insuring some property 
against damage, e.g., fire or theft. After examining the risks and the premium you 
find  that  you  have  no  clear  preference  between  the  options  of  purchasing 
insurance or leaving the property uninsured. 
It is then  called to your attention  that the  insurance company offers a new 
program called probabilistic  insurance. In this program you pay half of the regular 
premium. In case of damage, there is a 50 per cent chance that you pay the other 
half of the premium and the insurance company covers all the losses; and there is a 
50 per cent chance that you get back your insurance payment and suffer all the 
losses. For example, if an accident occurs on an odd day of the month, you pay the 
other half of the regular premium and your losses are covered; but if the accident 270  D.  KAHNEMAN  AND  A.  TVERSKY 
occurs on an even day of the month, your insurance payment is refunded and your 
losses are not covered. 
Recall that the premium for full coverage is such that you find this insurance 
barely worth its cost. 
Under these circumstances, would you purchase probabilistic insurance: 
Yes,  No. 
N=95  [20]  [80]* 
Although Problem 9 may appear contrived, it is worth noting that probabilistic 
insurance represents many forms of protective action where one pays a certain 
cost to reduce the probability of  an undesirable event-without  eliminating it 
altogether. The installation of a burglar alarm, the replacement of old tires, and 
the decision to stop smoking can all be viewed as probabilistic insurance. 
The responses to Problem 9 and to several other variants of the same question 
indicate that probabilistic insurance is generally unattractive. Apparently, reduc- 
ing the probability of  a loss from p  to p12 is less  valuable  than reducing the 
probability of that loss from p/2  to 0. 
In contrast to these data, expected utility theory (with a concave u) implies that 
probabilistic insurance is superior to regular insurance. That is, if at asset position 
w one is just willing to pay a premium y to insure against a probability p of losing 
x, then one should definitely be willing to pay a smaller premium ry to reduce the 
probability of losing x from p to (1-  r)p, 0 < r <  1. Formally, if one is indifferent 
between  (w - x, p; w, 1 -p)  and  (w -  y),  then  one  should  prefer  probabilistic 
insurance (w-x,  (1-r)p;  w-y,  rp; w-ry,  1-p)  over regular insurance (w-y). 
To prove this proposition, we show that 
pu (w-x)  + (1-p)  u (w) = u (w-y) 
implies 
(1-  r)pu(w  -x)  + rpu(w  -  y) +  (-p)u(w  -  ry)>  u(w  -  y). 
Without loss of generality, we can set u(w -x)  = 0  and u(w) = 1. Hence,  u(w- 
y) = 1-p,  and we wish to show that 
rp(1-p)+(1-p)u(w-ry)>  1-p  or  u(w-ry)>  1-rp 
which holds if and only if u is concave. 
This is a rather puzzling consequence  of the risk aversion hypothesis of utility 
theory,  because  probabilistic insurance appears intuitively riskier than regular 
insurance, which entirely eliminates the element of risk. Evidently, the intuitive 
notion of risk is not adequately captured by the assumed concavity of the utility 
function for wealth. 
The aversion for probabilistic insurance is particularly intriguing because  all 
insurance is, in a sense, probabilistic. The most avid buyer of insurance remains 
vulnerable to many financial and other risks which his policies do not cover. There 
appears to be a significant difference between  probabilistic insurance and what 
may be called contingent insurance, which provides the certainty of coverage for a PROSPECT  THEORY  271 
specified type of risk. Compare, for example, probabilistic insurance against all 
forms of loss or damage to the contents of your home and contingent insurance 
that eliminates all risk of loss from theft, say, but does not cover other risks, e.g., 
fire. We conjecture that contingent  insurance will be generally more attractive 
than  probabilistic  insurance  when  the  probabilities  of  unprotected  loss  are 
equated. Thus, two prospects that are equivalent in probabilities and outcomes 
could  have  different values  depending  on  their formulation.  Several  demon- 
strations of this general phenomenon  are described in the next section. 
The Isolation Effect 
In order to simplify the choice  between  alternatives, people  often  disregard 
components  that  the  alternatives  share,  and  focus  on  the  components  that 
distinguish them (Tversky [44]). This approach to choice problems may produce 
inconsistent  preferences,  because  a pair of prospects  can be decomposed  into 
common and distinctive components in more than one way, and different decom- 
positions sometimes lead to different preferences. We refer to this phenomenon as 
the isolation effect. 
PROBLEM  10: Consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, there is 
a probability of .75 to end the game without winning anything, and a probability of 
.25 to move into the second stage. If you reach the second stage you have a choice 
between 
(4,000,.80)  and  (3,000). 
Your choice must be made before the game starts, i.e., before the outcome of the 
first stage is known. 
Note that in this game, one has a choice between  .25 x.80=  .20 chance to win 
4,000,  and a .25 x 1.0 = .25 chance to win 3,000. Thus, in terms of final outcomes 
and probabilities one faces a choice between  (4,000,  .20) and (3,000,  .25), as in 
Problem 4 above.  However,  the dominant preferences are different in the two 
problems. Of 141 subjects who answered Problem 10, 78 per cent chose the latter 
prospect,  contrary to  the  modal  preference  in Problem  4.  Evidently,  people 
ignored the first stage of the game, whose outcomes are shared by both prospects, 
and considered Problem  10 as a choice between  (3,000)  and (4,000,.80),  as in 
Problem 3 above. 
The standard and the sequential formulations of Problem 4 are represented as 
decision trees in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Following the usual convention, 
squares denote  decision  nodes  and circles denote  chance nodes.  The essential 
difference between the two representations is in the location of the decision node. 
In the standard form (Figure 1), the decision maker faces a choice between two 
risky prospects,  whereas  in the  sequential  form  (Figure 2)  he  faces  a choice 
between  a risky and a riskless prospect. This is accomplished by introducing a 
dependency  between  the  prospects  without  changing  either  probabilities  or 272  D.  KAHNEMAN  AND  A.  TVERSKY 
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FIGURE  2.-The  representation of Problem 4 as a decision tree (standard formulation). 
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FIGURE 2.-The  representation of Problem 10 as a decision tree (sequential formulation). 
outcomes. Specifically, the event 'not winning 3,000'  is included in the event 'not 
winning 4,000'  in the sequential formulation, while the two events are indepen- 
dent  in the  standard formulation.  Thus,  the  outcome  of  winning 3,000  has a 
certainty advantage in the sequential formulation, which it does not have in the 
standard formulation. 
The reversal of preferences due to the dependency among events is particularly 
significant because  it  violates  the  basic  supposition  of  a  decision-theoretical 
analysis, that choices between prospects are determined solely by the probabilities 
of final states. 
It is easy to think of decision problems that are most naturally represented in 
one of the forms above rather than in the other. For example, the choice between 
two different risky ventures is likely to be viewed in the standard form. On the 
other  hand,  the  following  problem  is  most  likely  to  be  represented  in  the 
sequential form. One may invest money  in a venture with some probability of 
losing one's capital if the venture fails, and with a choice between a fixed agreed 
return and a percentage of earnings if it succeeds. The isolation effect implies that 
the contingent certainty of the fixed return enhances  the attractiveness of this 
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The preceding problem illustrated how preferences may be altered by different 
representations of probabilities. We now show how choices may be altered by 
varying the representation of outcomes. 
Consider the following problems, which were presented to two different groups 
of subjects. 
PROBLEM  11: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1,000. 
You are now asked to choose between 
A:  (1,000,.50),  and  B:  (500). 
N=  70  [16]  [84]* 
PROBLEM  12: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 2,000. 
You are now asked to choose between 
C:  (-1,000,.50),  and  D:  (-500). 
N = 68  [69*]  [31] 
The majority of subjects chose B in the first  problem and C in the second. These 
preferences conform to the reflection effect observed in Table I, which exhibits 
risk aversion for positive  prospects  and risk seeking  for negative  ones.  Note, 
however, that when viewed in terms of final states, the two choice problems are 
identical. Specifically, 
A = (2,000,  .50; 1,000, .50) = C,  and  B = (1,500) = D. 
In fact, Problem 12 is obtained from Problem 11 by adding 1,000  to the initial 
bonus, and subtracting 1,000 from all outcomes.  Evidently, the subjects did not 
integrate  the  bonus  with  the  prospects.  The  bonus  did  not  enter  into  the 
comparison of prospects because it was common to both options in each problem. 
The pattern of results observed in Problems 11 and 12 is clearly inconsistent with 
utility theory. In that theory, for example, the same utility is assigned to a wealth 
of $100, 000, regardless of whether it was reached from a prior wealth of $95,000 
or $105,000.  Consequently, the choice between  a total wealth of $100,000  and 
even chances to own $95,000  or $105,000  should be independent of whether one 
currently owns the smaller or the larger of these two amounts. With the added 
assumption  of  risk aversion,  the  theory  entails  that  the  certainty of  owning 
$100,000  should always be preferred to the gamble. However,  the responses to 
Problem 12 and to several of the previous questions suggest that this pattern will 
be obtained  if the individual owns the smaller amount, but not if he owns the 
larger amount. 
The apparent neglect of a bonus that was common to both options in Problems 
11 and 12 implies that the carriers of value or utility are changes of wealth, rather 
than  final asset positions  that  include  current wealth.  This  conclusion  is the 
cornerstone of  an alternative theory of risky choice,  which is described in the 
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3.  THEORY 
The preceding discussion reviewed several empirical effects which appear to 
invalidate expected  utility theory as a descriptive model. The remainder of the 
paper presents an alternative account of individual decision making under risk, 
called  prospect  theory.  The  theory  is  developed  for  simple  prospects  with 
monetary  outcomes  and stated  probabilities,  but it can be  extended  to  more 
involved choices. Prospect theory distinguishes two phases in the choice process: 
an early phase of editing and a subsequent phase of evaluation. The editing phase 
consists of a preliminary analysis of the offered prospects, which often yields a 
simpler  representation  of  these  prospects.  In  the  second  phase,  the  edited 
prospects  are evaluated  and the prospect of highest value  is chosen.  We  next 
outline the editing phase, and develop  a formal model of the evaluation phase. 
The function of the editing phase is to organize and reformulate the options so 
as to simplify subsequent  evaluation  and choice.  Editing consists of the appli- 
cation  of  several  operations  that  transform  the  outcomes  and  probabilities 
associated with the offered prospects. The major operations of the editing phase 
are described below. 
Coding. The  evidence  discussed  in the  previous  section  shows  that people 
normally perceive  outcomes  as gains and losses,  rather than as final states of 
wealth or welfare. Gains and losses, of course, are defined relative to some neutral 
reference  point.  The  reference  point  usually corresponds to  the  current asset 
position, in which case gains and losses coincide with the actual amounts that are 
received  or  paid.  However,  the  location  of  the  reference  point,  and  the 
consequent  coding  of  outcomes  as  gains  or  losses,  can  be  affected  by  the 
formulation of  the  offered prospects,  and by the  expectations  of  the decision 
maker. 
Combination. Prospects can sometimes  be simplified by combining the prob- 
abilities  associated  with  identical  outcomes.  For  example,  the  prospect 
(200, .25; 200, .25) will be reduced to (200, .50). and evaluated in this form. 
Segregation. Some prospects contain a riskless component  that is segregated 
from  the  risky  component  in  the  editing  phase.  For  example,  the  prospect 
(300, .80; 200, .20) is naturally decomposed  into a sure gain of 200 and the risky 
prospect (100, .80). Similarly, the prospect (-400,  .40; -100,  .60) is readily seen 
to consist of a sure loss of 100 and of the prospect (-300,  .40). 
The preceding operations are applied to each prospect separately. The follow- 
ing operation is applied to a set of two or more prospects. 
Cancellation.  The  essence  of  the  isolation  effects  described  earlier  is  the 
discarding of  components  that are shared by the offered prospects. Thus, our 
respondents apparently ignored the first stage of the sequential game presented in 
Problem 10, because this stage was common to both options, and they evaluated 
the  prospects  with  respect  to  the  results of  the  second  stage  (see  Figure  2). 
Similarly, they neglected  the common bonus that was added to the prospects in 
Problems  11 and  12.  Another  type  of  cancellation  involves  the  discarding of 
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between (200, .20; 100, .50; -50,  .30) and (200, .20; 150, .50; -100,  .30) can be 
reduced  by  cancellation  to  a  choice  between  (100,.50;  -50,.30)  and 
(150, .50; -100,  .30). 
Two additional operations that should be mentioned are simplification and the 
detection  of  dominance.  The  first refers to  the  simplification of  prospects  by 
rounding probabilities or outcomes. For example, the prospect (101, .49) is likely 
to be recoded  as an even chance to win 100. A particularly important form of 
simplification involves the discarding of extremely unlikely outcomes. The second 
operation involves the scanning of offered prospects to detect dominated alter- 
natives, which are rejected without further evaluation. 
Because the editing operations facilitate the task of decision, it is assumed that 
they are performed whenever possible. However, some editing operations either 
permit or prevent the application of others. For example, (500, .20; 101, .49) will 
appear to dominate (500, .15; 99, .51) if the second constituents of both prospects 
are simplified to (100, .50). The final edited prospects could, therefore, depend on 
the sequence of editing operations, which is likely to vary with the structure of the 
offered set and with the format of the display. A detailed study of this problem is 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  treatment.  In this paper we  discuss  choice 
problems where it is reasonable to assume either that the original formulation of 
the prospects leaves no room for further editing, or that the edited prospects can 
be specified without ambiguity. 
Many anomalies of preference result from the editing of prospects. For exam- 
ple, the inconsistencies associated with the isolation effect result from the cancel- 
lation of common components. Some intransitivities of choice are explained by a 
simplification that eliminates small differences between  prospects (see Tversky 
[43]).  More  generally,  the  preference  order  between  prospects  need  not  be 
invariant across contexts, because the same offered prospect could be edited in 
different ways depending on the context in which it appears. 
Following the editing phase, the decision maker is assumed to evaluate each of 
the edited prospects,  and to choose  the prospect of highest value. The overall 
value of an edited prospect, denoted  V, is expressed in terms of two scales,  7T 
and v. 
The first scale,  v, associates with each probability p a decision weight  7T(p), 
which reflects the impact of p on the over-all value of the prospect. However,  vT  is 
not  a probability  measure,  and  it will  be  shown  later that  v (p) + v (l  -  p)  is 
typically less than unity. The second scale, v, assigns to each outcome x a number 
v (x), which reflects the subjective value of that outcome. Recall that outcomes are 
defined relative to a reference point, which serves as the zero point of the value 
scale. Hence,  v measures the value of deviations from that reference point, i.e., 
gains and losses. 
The  present  formulation  is  concerned  with  simple  prospects  of  the  form 
(x, p; y, q), which have at most two non-zero outcomes.  In such a prospect, one 
receives x with probability p, y with probability q, and nothing with probability 
1 -  p -  q, where p + q -  1. An offered prospect is strictly positive if its outcomes 
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are all negative. A prospect is regular if it is neither strictly positive nor strictly 
negative. 
The basic equation of the theory describes the manner in which ir  and v are 
combined to determine the over-all value of regular prospects. 
If (x, p; y, q) is a regular prospect (i.e., either p + q < 1, or x  y, or x  - O 
y), then 
(1)  V(x, p; y, q)=i7r(p)v(x)+r(q)v(y) 
where  v(0) =  Q-,  ir(O)  =0,  and  7r(1)  =  1.  As  in utility theory,  V  is defined  on 
prospects,  while  v  is defined  on  outcomes.  The  two  scales  coincide  for  sure 
prospects, where  V(x, 1.0) = V(x) = v(x). 
Equation  (1) generalizes  expected  utility theory by relaxing the expectation 
principle. An axiomatic analysis of this representation is sketched in the Appen- 
dix, which describes conditions  that ensure the existence  of a unique  X  and a 
ratio-scale v satisfying equation (1). 
The  evaluation  of  strictly positive  and strictly negative  prospects  follows  a 
different  rule.  In  the  editing  phase  such  prospects  are  segregated  into  two 
components:  (i) the riskless component,  i.e., the minimum gain or loss which is 
certain to be obtained or paid; (ii) the risky component, i.e., the additional gain or 
loss which is actually at stake. The evaluation of such prospects is described in the 
next equation. 
If p +q  = 1 and either x > y > 0 or x < y < 0,  then 
(2)  V(x, p; y, q) = v (y) + mr(p)[v  (x) -  v (y)]. 
That is, the value of a strictly positive or strictly negative prospect equals the value 
of  the  riskless  component  plus  the  value-difference  between  the  outcomes, 
multiplied by the weight associated with the more extreme outcome. For example, 
V(400,  .25; 100, .75) = v (100) + r(.25)[v (400)-  v (100)].  The  essential  feature 
of  equation  (2)  is  that  a  decision  weight  is  applied  to  the  value-difference 
v (x) -  v (y), which represents the risky component of the prospect, but not to v (y), 
which  represents  the  riskless  component.  Note  that  the  right-hand  side  of 
equation  (2) equals  r(p)v(x)  +[1  -  r(p)]v(y).  Hence,  equation  (2) reduces  to 
equation  (1) if wr(p)  +  r(l - p) = 1. As will be shown later, this condition is not 
generally satisfied. 
Many elements of the evaluation model have appeared in previous attempts to 
modify expected utility theory. Markowitz [29] was the first to propose that utility 
be defined on gains and losses rather than on final asset positions, an assumption 
which has been implicitly accepted in most experimental measurements of utility 
(see,  e.g.,  [7, 32]).  Markowitz also noted  the presence  of risk seeking  in pref- 
erences among positive as well as among negative prospects, and he proposed a 
utility function which has convex and concave regions in both the positive and the 
negative  domains.  His  treatment,  however,  retains the  expectation  principle; 
hence it cannot account for the many violations of this principle; see, e.g., Table I. 
The  replacement  of probabilities by more general weights was proposed  by 
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[3, 42]).  Similar models  were  developed  by Fellner  [12],  who  introduced  the 
concept of decision weight to explain aversion for ambiguity, and by van Dam [46] 
who attempted to scale decision weights. For other critical analyses of expected 
utility theory and alternative choice models, see Allais [2], Coombs [6], Fishburn 
[13], and Hansson [22]. 
The equations of prospect theory retain the general bilinear form that underlies 
expected utility theory. However, in order to accomodate the effects described in 
the first part of the paper, we are compelled to assume that values are attached to 
changes rather than to final states, and that decision weights do not coincide with 
stated probabilities. These departures from expected utility theory must lead to 
normatively unacceptable consequences,  such as inconsistencies, intransitivities, 
and violations  of  dominance.  Such anomalies  of preference  are normally cor- 
rected by the decision maker when he realizes that his preferences are inconsis- 
tent,  intransitive,  or  inadmissible.  In  many  situations,  however,  the  decision 
maker does not have the opportunity to discover that his preferences could violate 
decision  rules  that  he  wishes  to  obey.  In these  circumstances the  anomalies 
implied by prospect theory are expected to occur. 
The Value Function 
An  essential  feature  of  the  present  theory  is that the  carriers of  value  are 
changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states. This assumption is compati- 
ble with basic principles of perception and judgment. Our perceptual apparatus is 
attuned to the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the evaluation of 
absolute magnitudes. When we respond to attributes such as brightness, loudness, 
or temperature, the past and present context of experience defines an adaptation 
level, or reference point, and stimuli are perceived in relation to this reference 
point [23]. Thus, an object at a given temperature may be experienced as hot or 
cold to the touch depending on the temperature to which one has adapted. The 
same principle applies to  non-sensory  attributes such as health,  prestige,  and 
wealth. The same level of wealth, for example, may imply abject poverty for one 
person and great riches for another-depending  on their current assets. 
The emphasis on changes as the carriers of value should not be taken to imply 
that the value of a particular change is independent  of initial position.  Strictly 
speaking,  value  should  be  treated  as a function  in  two  arguments: the  asset 
position that serves as reference point, and the magnitude of the change (positive 
or negative) from that reference point. An  individual's attitude to money,  say, 
could be described by a book, where each page presents the value function for 
changes at a particular asset position.  Clearly, the value functions described on 
different pages  are not  identical:  they  are likely  to  become  more  linear with 
increases in assets.  However,  the preference  order of  prospects is not greatly 
altered  by small or even  moderate  variations in asset position.  The  certainty 
equivalent of the prospect (1,000,  .50), for example, lies between 300 and 400 for 
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of value as a function in one argument generally provides a satisfactory approxi- 
mation. 
Many sensory  and perceptual  dimensions  share the  property that the  psy- 
chological response is a concave function of the magnitude of physical change. For 
example, it is easier to discriminate between a change of 30 and a change of 60 in 
room temperature, than it is to discriminate between a change of 130 and a change 
of  160. We propose that this principle applies in particular to the evaluation of 
monetary changes. Thus, the difference in value between a gain of 100 and a gain 
of 200 appears to be greater than the difference between a gain of 1,100 and a gain 
of 1,200. Similarly, the difference between a loss of 100 and a loss of 200 appears 
greater than the difference between a loss of 1,100 and a loss of 1,200, unless the 
larger loss is intolerable. Thus, we hypothesize that the value function for changes 
of wealth is normally concave above the reference point (v"(x) < 0, for x > 0) and 
often convex below it (v"(x) > 0, for x < 0). That is, the marginal value of both 
gains and losses generally decreases with their magnitude. Some support for this 
hypothesis  has  been  reported  by  Galanter  and  Pliner  [17],  who  scaled  the 
perceived magnitude of monetary and non-monetary gains and losses. 
The above hypothesis regarding the shape of the value function was based on 
responses  to gains and losses  in a riskless context.  We propose  that the value 
function which is derived from risky choices shares the same characteristics, as 
illustrated in the following problems. 
PROBLEM  13: 
(6,000,  .25),  or  (4,000,  .25; 2,000,  .25). 
N =68  [18]  [82]* 
PROBLEM  13': 
(-6,000,  .25),  or  (-4,000,.25;  -2,000,.25). 
N=64  [70]*  [30] 
Applying equation 1 to the modal preference in these problems yields 
7r(.25)v  (6,000) <  r(.25)[v  (4,000) + v(2,000)]  and 
vr(.25)v  (-6,000)  >  vr(.25)[v  (-4,000)  + v (-2,000)]. 
Hence,  v (6,000) <  v (4,000) + v (2,000)  and v (-6,000)  > v (-4,000)  + v (-2,000). 
These  preferences  are in accord with the hypothesis  that the value function is 
concave for gains and convex for losses. 
Any discussion of the utility function for money must leave room for the effect 
of special circumstances on preferences. For example, the utility function of an 
individual who needs $60,000  to purchase a house may reveal an exceptionally 
steep rise near the critical value. Similarly, an individual's aversion to losses may 
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a less desirable neighborhood.  Hence,  the derived value (utility) function of an 
individual does  not always reflect "pure" attitudes to money,  since it could be 
affected  by  additional  consequences  associated  with  specific  amounts.  Such 
perturbations can readily produce convex regions in the value function for gains 
and concave  regions  in the  value  function  for losses.  The  latter case  may be 
more common since large losses often necessitate changes in life style. 
A  salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that losses loom 
larger than gains. The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money 
appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount 
[17].  Indeed,  most  people  find  symmetric  bets  of  the  form  (x,.50;  -x,.50) 
distinctly  unattractive.  Moreover,  the  aversiveness  of  symmetric  fair  bets 
generally  increases  with  the  size  of  the  stake.  That  is,  if  x > y :  0,  then 
(y, .50; -y,  .50) is preferred to (x, .50; -x,  .50). According to equation (1), there- 
fore, 
v(y)+v(-y)>v(x)+v(-x)  and  v(-y)-v(-x)>v(x)-v(y). 
Setting  y =0  yields  v(x) < -v(-x),  and letting  y  approach x  yields  v'(x) < 
v'(-x),  provided v', the derivative of v, exists. Thus, the value function for losses is 
steeper than the value function for gains. 
In  summary,  we  have  proposed  that  the  value  function  is  (i)  defined  on 
deviations from the reference  point;  (ii) generally concave  for gains and com- 
monly convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains. A value function 
which satisfies these properties is displayed in Figure 3. Note that the proposed 
S-shaped value function is steepest at the reference point, in marked contrast to 
the utility function postulated by Markowitz [29] which is relatively shallow in that 
region. 
VALUE 
LOSSES  GAINS 
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Although the present theory can be applied to derive the value function from 
preferences between  prospects, the actual scaling is considerably more compli- 
cated than in utility theory, because of the introduction of decision weights. For 
example, decision weights could produce risk aversion and risk seeking even with 
a linear value function. Nevertheless,  it is of interest that the main properties 
ascribed to the value function have been observed in a detailed analysis of von 
Neumann-Morgenstern  utility functions  for changes  of  wealth  (Fishburn and 
Kochenberger [14]). The functions had been obtained from thirty decision makers 
in various fields of business, in five independent studies [5, 18, 19, 21, 40]. Most 
utility functions for gains were concave, most functions for losses were convex, 
and only three individuals exhibited risk aversion for both gains and losses. With a 
single exception,  utility functions were considerably steeper for losses than for 
gains. 
The Weighting  Function 
In prospect theory, the value of each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight. 
Decision weights are inferred from choices between prospects much as subjective 
probabilities  are  inferred from  preferences  in  the  Ramsey-Savage  approach. 
However, decision weights are not probabilities: they do not obey the probability 
axioms and they should not be interpreted as measures of degree or belief. 
Consider a gamble in which one can win 1,000 or nothing, depending on the toss 
of a fair coin. For any reasonable person, the probability of winning is .50 in this 
situation. This can be verified in a variety of ways, e.g., by showing that the subject 
is indifferent between  betting on heads or tails, or by his verbal report that he 
considers the two events  equiprobable.  As will be shown below,  however,  the 
decision weight 7r(.50) which is derived from choices is likely to be smaller than 
.50. Decision  weights measure the impact of events on the desirability of pros- 
pects, and not merely the perceived likelihood  of these events.  The two scales 
coincide (i.e.,  77(p)  = p) if the expectation principle holds, but not otherwise. 
The choice problems discussed in the present paper were formulated in terms of 
explicit numerical probabilities, and our analysis assumes that the respondents 
adopted the stated values of p. Furthermore, since the events were identified only 
by their stated  probabilities,  it is possible  in this context  to  express  decision 
weights  as a function  of  stated  probability. In general,  however,  the decision 
weight attached to an event could be influenced by other factors, e.g., ambiguity 
[10, 11]. 
We turn now to discuss the salient properties of the weighting function 7r,  which 
relates  decision  weights  to  stated  probabilities.  Naturally,  1T  is  an increasing 
function of p, with  rr(0)  = 0  and  r(1) = 1. That is, outcomes  contingent  on an 
impossible event are ignored, and the scale is normalized so that 7(p)  is the ratio 
of the weight associated with the probability p to the weight associated with the 
certain event. 
We  first discuss some  properties  of  the  weighting  function  for small prob- 
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is a subadditive  function  of  p, i.e.,  ir(rp)>  rir(p) for  0<  r <  1.  Recall  that in 
Problem 8, (6,000,  .001) is preferred to (3,000,  .002). Hence 
7T(.OO1) V(3,000)  1 
7(.001)>  V(3,000)  2  by the concavity of v. 
,77(.002)  v(6,000)  2 
The reflected preferences in Problem 8' yield the same conclusion. The pattern of 
preferences in Problems 7 and 7', however, suggests that subadditivity need not 
hold for large values of p. 
Furthermore,  we  propose  that  very  low  probabilities  are  generally  over- 
weighted, that is,  vr(p) >  p for small p. Consider the following choice problems. 
PROBLEM  14: 
(5,000,.001),  or  (5). 
N=72  [72]*  [28] 
PROBLEM  14': 
(-5,000,.001),  or  (-5). 
N=72  [17]  [83]* 
Note that in Problem 14, people prefer what is in effect a lottery ticket over the 
expected  value of that ticket. In Problem 14', on the other hand, they prefer a 
small loss, which can be viewed as the payment of an insurance premium, over a 
small probability of  a large loss.  Similar observations  have  been  reported by 
Markowitz [29]. In the present theory, the preference for the lottery in Problem 
14  implies  r(.001)v(5,000)>v(5),  hence  vr(.001)>v(5)/v(5,000)>.001, 
assuming  the  value  function  for  gains  is  concave.  The  readiness  to  pay  for 
insurance  in  Problem  14'  implies  the  same  conclusion,  assuming  the  value 
function for losses is convex. 
It is  important to  distinguish overweighting,  which  refers to  a property of 
decision weights, from the overestimation that is commonly found in the assess- 
ment of the probability of rare events. Note that the issue of overestimation does 
not arise in the present context, where the subject is assumed to adopt the stated 
value of p. In many real-life situations, overestimation  and overweighting may 
both operate to increase the impact of rare events. 
Although 7r  (p) > p for low probabilities, there is evidence to suggest that, for all 
O<p  <1,  ir(p) + ,r(1 -  p) < 1. We  label this property subcertainty. It is readily 
seen  that the  typical preferences  in any version  of  Allias'  example  (see,  e.g., 
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equation (1) to the prevalent preferences in Problems 1 and 2 yields, respectively, 
v (2,400) > 7T(.66)v  (2,400) + 7T(.33)V  (2,500),  i.e., 
[1 -  7T(.66]v  (2,400) > 7T(.33)V  (2,500)  and 
v G  33)v (2,500) > 7T(.34)v  (2,400);  hence, 
1- 7(.66)  > 7v(.34),  or  7v(.66)  +  i(.34) < 1. 
Applying the same analysis to Allais' original example yields 7T(.89) + 7T(.1  1) < 1, 
and some data reported by MacCrimmon and Larsson [28] imply subcertainty for 
additional values of p. 
The slope of 7T  in the interval (0, 1) can be viewed as a measure of the sensitivity 
of preferences to changes in probability. Subcertainty entails that 7T  is regressive 
with respect to p, i.e., that preferences are generally less sensitive to variations of 
probability  than  the  expectation  principle  would  dictate.  Thus,  subcertainty 
captures an essential element  of people's  attitudes to uncertain events, namely 
that the sum of the weights associated with complementary events is typically less 
than the weight associated with the certain event. 
Recall  that the violations  of  the substitution axiom discussed earlier in this 
paper conform to the following rule: If (x, p) is equivalent to (y, pq) then (x, pr) is 
not preferred to (y, pqr), O  < p, q, r  1. By equation (1), 
7T(p)v(x)  =  7T(pq)v(y)  implies  7T(pr)v (x)  v  7T(pqr)v ( y);  hence, 
7T(pq)  7(pqr) 
v (p)  (pr) 
Thus, for a fixed ratio of probabilities, the ratio of the corresponding decision 
weights is closer to unity when the probabilities are low than when they are high. 
This property of v, called subproportionality, imposes considerable constraints on 
the shape of  v: it holds if and only if log  7T  is a convex function of log p. 
It is of interest to note that subproportionality together with the overweighting 
of small probabilities imply that 7T  is subadditive over that range. Formally, it can 
be shown that if v (p) > p and subproportionality holds, then  v (rp)  > rir(p), 0 < 
r < 1, provided  7- is monotone  and continuous over (0, 1). 
Figure 4 presents a hypothetical weighting function which satisfies overweight- 
ing and subadditivity for small values  of  p,  as well  as subcertainty  and sub- 
proportionality. These properties entail that  7T is relatively shallow in the open 
interval and changes abruptly near the end-points where  7(0)=  0 and 7v(1)  = 1. 
The sharp drops or apparent discontinuities of  7T  at the endpoints are consistent 
with the notion that there is a limit to how small a decision weight can be attached 
to an event,  if it is given any weight at all. A  similar quantum of doubt could 
impose an upper limit on any decision weight that is less than unity. This quantal 
effect may reflect the categorical distinction between  certainty and uncertainty. 
On the other hand, the simplification of prospects in the editing phase can lead the 
individual to discard events of extremely low probability and to treat events of 
extremely high probability as if they were certain. Because people are limited in PROSPECT  THEORY  283 
their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely 
events  are  either  ignored  or  overweighted,  and  the  difference  between  high 
probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated. Consequently,  Ir is 
not well-behaved  near the end-points. 
1.0 
0. 
Wj  .5 
z 
CD) 
0  .5  1.0 
STATED  PROBABILITY:  p 
FIGURE 4.-A  hypothetical weighting function. 
The  following  example,  due  to  Zeckhauser,  illustrates  the  hypothesized 
nonlinearity of  ir.  Suppose you are compelled  to play Russian roulette, but are 
given the opportunity to purchase the removal of one bullet from the loaded gun. 
Would you pay as much to reduce the number of bullets from four to three as you 
would to reduce the number of bullets from one to zero? Most people  feel that 
they would be willing to pay much more for a reduction of the probability of death 
from 1/6  to zero than for a reduction from 4/6  to 3/6.  Economic considerations 
would  lead  one  to  pay  more  in  the  latter  case,  where  the  value  of  money 
is presumably reduced by the considerable probability that one will not live to 
enjoy it. 
An  obvious objection  to the assumption that  v (p) ? p involves comparisons 
between prospects of the form (x, p; x, q) and (x, p'; x, q'), where p + q = p' + q' < 
1. Since any individual will surely be indifferent between  the two prospects, it 
could be argued that this observation entails r(p)  + ir(q)  =  vr(p') +  ir(q'),  which in 
turn implies that ir is the identity function. This argument is invalid in the present 
theory, which assumes that the probabilities of identical outcomes are combined 
in the editing of prospects. A  more serious objection  to the nonlinearity of  ir 
involves potential violations of dominance. Suppose x > y > 0, p > p', and p + q = 
p'+q'<  1;  hence,  (x, p; y, q)  dominates  (x, p'; y, q').  If  preference  obeys 284  D.  KAHNEMAN  AND  A.  TVERSKY 
dominance, then 
orr(p)v  (x) + r(q)v(y)  > r1(p')v(x) + ir(q')v(y), 
or 
(P)-(P')  v(y 
ir(q')-ir(q)  v(x) 
Hence,  as y approaches x, vr(p)  -  i(p')  approaches 7r(q')  -  7r(q). Since p - p' = 
q'-  q, 7  must be essentially linear, or else dominance must be violated. 
Direct  violations of dominance  are prevented,  in the present theory, by the 
assumption that dominated alternatives are detected and eliminated prior to the 
evaluation  of  prospects.  However,  the  theory  permits  indirect  violations  of 
dominance, e.g., triples of prospects so that A is preferred to B, B is preferred to 
C, and C dominates A. For an example, see Raiffa [34, p. 75]. 
Finally, it should be noted  that the present treatment concerns the simplest 
decision task in which a person chooses between two available prospects. We have 
not treated in detail the more complicated production task (e.g., bidding) where 
the  decision  maker generates  an alternative that is equal  in value  to  a given 
prospect. The asymmetry between the two options in this situation could intro- 
duce systematic biases.  Indeed,  Lichtenstein  and Slovic [27]  have  constructed 
pairs of prospects A  and B, such that people generally prefer A  over B, but bid 
more for B than for A. This phenomenon  has been confirmed in several studies, 
with both hypothetical  and real gambles, e.g.,  Grether and Plott [20].  Thus, it 
cannot  be  generally  assumed  that  the  preference  order  of  prospects  can  be 
recovered by a bidding procedure. 
Because prospect theory has been proposed as a model of choice, the inconsis- 
tency of bids and choices implies that the measurement of values and decision 
weights should be based on choices between  specified prospects rather than on 
bids or other production tasks. This restriction makes the assessment of v and ir 
more difficult because production tasks are more convenient for scaling than pair 
comparisons. 
4.  DISCUSSION 
In  the  final section  we  show  how  prospect  theory  accounts  for  observed 
attitudes  toward  risk, discuss  alternative  representations  of  choice  problems 
induced by shifts of reference point, and sketch several extensions of the present 
treatment. 
Risk Attitudes 
The dominant pattern of preferences observed in Allais' example (Problems 1 
and 2) follows from the present theory iff 
rr(.33)  v (2,400)  r(.33) 
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Hence,  the  violation  of  the  independence  axiom  is attributed in this case  to 
subcertainty,  and more  specifically to  the  inequality  vr(.34)  < 1-  7r(.66). This 
analysis shows that an Allais-type violation will occur whenever the v-ratio of the 
two non-zero outcomes is bounded by the corresponding rr-ratios. 
Problems 3 through 8 share the same structure, hence it suffices to consider one 
pair, say Problems 7 and 8. The observed choices in these problems are implied by 
the theory iff 
7r(.O01)  v(3,000)  7r(.45) 
r(.002)  v(6,000)  r(.90)O 
The violation  of the substitution axiom is attributed in this case to the sub- 
proportionality of  7r.  Expected  utility theory is violated  in the above  manner, 
therefore, whenever the v- ratio of the two outcomes is bounded by the respective 
7r-  ratios. The same analysis applies to other violations of the substitution axiom, 
both in the positive and in the negative domain. 
We  next  prove  that the  preference  for regular insurance over  probabilistic 
insurance, observed in Problem 9, follows from prospect theory-provided  the 
probability of loss is overweighted.  That is, if (-x,  p) is indifferent to (-y),  then 
(-y)  is preferred  to (-x, p/2; -y, p/2; -y/2,  1-p).  For simplicity,  we define  for 
x  , 0, f(x)  =  -v(-x).  Since the value function for losses is convex, f is a concave 
function of x. Applying prospect theory, with the natural extension of equation 2, 
we wish to show that 
v (p)f(x) = f(y)  implies 
f(y)  -f<f(y/2)  +  r(p/2)[f(y)  -f(y/2)]  +  r(p/2)[f(x)  -f(y/2)] 
=  Vr(p/2)f(x)  + ir(p/2)f(y)  + [1 -  2ir(p/2)lf(y/2). 
Substituting for f(x)  and using the concavity of f, it suffices to show that 
f(y)  7  (p/2) f(y) + 7r(p/2)f(y)  +f(y)/2  -  7r(p/2)f(y) 
7T(p) 
or 
(p) /2  - 7r(p/2),  which follows from the subadditivity of  r. 
According to the present theory, attitudes toward risk are determined jointly by 
v and vr,  and not solely by the utility function. It is therefore instructive to examine 
the conditions under which risk aversion or risk seeking are expected to occur. 
Consider the choice  between  the gamble  (x, p)  and its expected  value  (px). If 
x > 0, risk seeking is implied whenever ir(p) > v(px)/v  (x), which is greater than p 
if the value  function  for gains is concave.  Hence,  overweighting  (vr(p) > p)  is 
necessary but not sufficient for risk seeking in the domain of gains. Precisely the 
same condition is necessary but not sufficient for risk aversion when x < 0. This 
analysis restricts risk seeking  in the  domain  of  gains and risk aversion in the 
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Indeed these are the typical conditions under which lottery tickets and insurance 
policies  are sold.  In prospect  theory,  the  overweighting  of  small probabilities 
favors both gambling and insurance, while the S-shaped value function tends to 
inhibit both behaviors. 
Although  prospect  theory  predicts  both  insurance  and  gambling  for  small 
probabilities, we feel that the present analysis falls far short of a fully adequate 
account  of  these  complex  phenomena.  Indeed,  there  is  evidence  from  both 
experimental studies [37],  survey research [26],  and observations of economic 
behavior, e.g., service and medical insurance, that the purchase of insurance often 
extends  to  the  medium range of  probabilities,  and that small probabilities of 
disaster are sometimes entirely ignored. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that 
minor changes in the formulation of the decision problem can have marked effects 
on  the attractiveness of  insurance [37].  A  comprehensive  theory of  insurance 
behavior should consider, in addition to pure attitudes toward uncertainty and 
money,  such  factors  as  the  value  of  security,  social  norms  of  prudence,  the 
aversiveness of a large number of small payments spread over time, information 
and  misinformation  regarding probabilities  and  outcomes,  and  many others. 
Some effects of these variables could be described within the present framework, 
e.g.,  as changes  of  reference  point,  transformations of  the  value  function,  or 
manipulations of probabilities or decision weights. Other effects may require the 
introduction of  variables or concepts  which have  not  been  considered  in this 
treatment. 
Shifts of Reference 
So far in this paper, gains and losses were defined by the amounts of money that 
are obtained or paid when a prospect is played, and the reference point was taken 
to be the status quo, or one's current assets. Although  this is probably true for 
most choice problems, there are situations in which gains and losses are coded 
relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo. For 
example,  an unexpected tax withdrawal from a monthly pay check is experien- 
ced as a loss, not as a reduced gain. Similarly, an entrepreneur who is weathering a 
slump with greater success than his competitors may interpret a small loss as a 
gain, relative to the larger loss he had reason to expect. 
The  reference  point  in  the  preceding  examples  corresponded  to  an  asset 
position that one had expected  to attain. A discrepancy between  the reference 
point and the current asset position may also arise because of recent changes in 
wealth to which one has not yet adapted [29]. Imagine a person who is involved in 
a business venture, has already lost 2,000  and is now facing a choice between a 
sure gain of 1,000 and an even chance to win 2,000  or nothing. If he has not yet 
adapted  to  his  losses,  he  is likely  to  code  the  problem  as a choice  between 
(-2,000,  .50)  and  (-1,000)  rather than  as a choice  between  (2,000,.50)  and 
(1,000).  As we have seen, the former representation induces more adventurous 
choices than the latter. 
A  change  of  reference  point  alters the  preference  order  for  prospects.  In 
particular, the  present  theory  implies  that  a  negative  translation of  a choice PROSPECT  THEORY  287 
problem, such as arises from incomplete adaptation to recent losses, increases risk 
seeking in some situations. Specifically, if a risky prospect (x, p;  -  y, 1-p)  is just 
acceptable,  then  (x -  z, p; -  y -  z, 1-  p)  is  preferred  over  (-  z)  for  x, y, z> 
0, with x>z. 
To prove this proposition, note that 
V(x, p; y, 1 -p)  = 0  iff  nr(p)v(x)  = -X(1  -p)v(-y). 
Furthermore, 
V(x-z,p;  -y-z,  1-p) 
= 7T(p)v(x-Z) + r(1  -p)v(-y  -z) 
>  r(p)v(x)  -  r(p)v(z)  +  ir(1  -p)v(-  y) 
+ Tr(1  - p)v (-  z)  by the properties of v, 
=-  r(1-p)V(-y)-  V(p)V(Z)  +7r(1-p)V(-y) 
+ ir(1 -p)v(-z)  by substitution, 
=-ir(p)v(z)  + ir(1 -p)v(-z) 
> v (-Z)[7(p)  + Vr(1-p)]  since v(-z)  < -v(z), 
>  v  ( -  z)  by subcertainty. 
This analysis suggests that a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely 
to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise. The well known 
observation [31] that the tendency to bet on long shots increases in the course of 
the betting day provides some support for the hypothesis that a failure to adapt to 
losses or to attain an expected  gain induces risk seeking. For another example, 
consider an individual who expects to purchase insurance, perhaps because he has 
owned  it in the past or because  his friends do.  This individual may code  the 
decision  to  pay a premium  y  to  protect  against a loss  x  as a choice  between 
(-x  +y, p; y, 1 -p)  and (0) rather than as a choice between (-x,  p) and (-y).  The 
preceding argument entails that insurance is likely to be more attractive in the 
former representation than in the latter. 
Another  important case  of  a shift of  reference  point  arises when  a person 
formulates his decision problem in terms of final assets, as advocated in decision 
analysis, rather than in terms of gains and losses,  as people  usually do. In this 
case, the reference point is set to zero on the scale of wealth and the value function 
is likely to be concave everywhere [39]. According to the present analysis, this 
formulation  essentially  eliminates  risk seeking,  except  for gambling with low 
probabilities. The explicit formulation of decision problems in terms of final assets 
is perhaps the most effective procedure for eliminating risk seeking in the domain 
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Many economic  decisions  involve  transactions in which one  pays money  in 
exchange for a desirable prospect. Current decision theories analyze such prob- 
lems  as  comparisons  between  the  status  quo  and  an  alternative  state  which 
includes the acquired prospect minus its cost. For example, the decision whether 
to  pay  10  for  the  gamble  (1,000,.01)  is  treated  as  a  choice  between 
(990,.01;  -10,.99)  and (0). In this analysis, readiness to purchase the positive 
prospect is equated to willingness to accept the corresponding mixed prospect. 
The prevalent failure to integrate riskless and risky prospects, dramatized in the 
isolation  effect,  suggests that people  are unlikely to perform the operation  of 
subtracting the cost from the outcomes  in deciding whether to  buy a gamble. 
Instead,  we  suggest  that  people  usually  evaluate  the  gamble  and  its  cost 
separately, and decide to purchase the gamble if the combined value is positive. 
Thus,  the  gamble  (1,000,.01)  will  be  purchased  for  a  price  of  10  if  X 
(.O1)v(1,000)+v(-10)>0. 
If this hypothesis is correct, the decision to pay 10 for (1,000,  .0 1), for example, 
is no longer equivalent to the decision to accept the gamble (990, .01; -10,  .99). 
Furthermore, prospect theory implies that if one  is indifferent between  (x (1- 
p), p; -px,  1 -p)  and (0) then one will not pay px to purchase the prospect (x, p). 
Thus, people  are expected  to exhibit more risk seeking in deciding whether to 
accept a fair gamble than in deciding whether to purchase a gamble for a fair price. 
The location of the reference point, and the manner in which'choice problems are 
coded and edited emerge as critical factors in the analysis of decisions. 
Extensions 
In order to encompass  a wider range of decision problems, prospect theory 
should be extended  in several directions. Some generalizations are immediate; 
others require further development.  The extension  of equations  (1) and (2) to 
prospects with any number of outcomes is straightforward. When the number of 
outcomes  is large,  however,  additional  editing  operations  may be  invoked  to 
simplify  evaluation.  The  manner  in  which  complex  options,  e.g.,  compound 
prospects, are reduced to simpler ones is yet to be investigated. 
Although  the  present  paper  has  been  concerned  mainly  with  monetary 
outcomes,  the theory is readily applicable to choices involving other attributes, 
e.g.,  quality of  life  or  the  number  of  lives  that  could  be  lost  or  saved  as  a 
consequence  of  a policy  decision.  The  main properties of  the proposed  value 
function for money  should apply to other attributes as well.  In particular, we 
expect  outcomes  to be coded  as gains or losses  relative to a neutral reference 
point, and losses to loom larger than gains. 
The theory can also be extended  to the typical situation of choice, where the 
probabilities of  outcomes  are not explicitly given.  In such situations,  decision 
weights must be attached to particular events rather than to stated probabilities, 
but they are expected to exhibit the essential properties that were ascribed to the 
weighting  function.  For example,  if A  and B  are complementary  events  and 
neither is certain, 7r(A)  + 7r(B) should be less than unity-a  natural analogue to 
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The  decision  weight  associated  with an event  will depend  primarily on  the 
perceived likelihood of that event, which could be subject to major biases [45]. In 
addition,  decision  weights  may  be  affected  by  other  considerations,  such  as 
ambiguity or vagueness. Indeed, the work of Ellsberg [10] and Fellner [12] implies 
that vagueness  reduces decision weights. Consequently,  subcertainty should be 
more pronounced for vague than for clear probabilities. 
The present analysis of preference  between  risky options has developed  two 
themes. The first theme concerns editing operations that determine how prospects 
are perceived. The second theme involves the judgmental principles that govern 
the  evaluation  of  gains and losses  and the  weighting  of  uncertain outcomes. 
Although  both themes  should be developed  further, they appear to provide a 
useful framework for the descriptive analysis of choice under risk. 
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APPENDIX2 
In this appendix  we sketch  an axiomatic  analysis  of prospect  theory.  Since  a complete  self-contained 
treatment  is  long  and  tedious,  we  merely  outline  the  essential  steps  and  exhibit  the  key  ordinal 
properties  needed  to  establish  the  bilinear  representation  of  equation  (1).  Similar  methods  could  be 
extended  to  axiomatize  equation  (2). 
Consider  the  set  of  all  regular  prospects  of  the  form  (x, p;  y, q)  with  p + q <  1.  The  extension  to 
regular  prospects  with  p + q =  1 is straightforward.  Let  denote  the  relation  of  preference  between 
prospects  that  is assumed  to  be  connected,  symmetric  and  transitive,  and  let  =  denote  the  associated 
relation  of  indifference.  Naturally,  (x,  p; y, q)  (y, q; x, p).  We  also  assume,  as  is  implicit  in  our 
notation,  that  (x, p;  0, q)  - (x, p;  0,  r),  and  (x, p;  y, 0)  = (x, p;  z, 0).  That  is,  the  null  outcome  and  the 
impossible  event  have  the  property  of  a multiplicative  zero. 
Note  that  the  desired  representation  (equation  (1))  is  additive  in  the  probability-outcome  pairs. 
Hence,  the  theory  of  additive  conjoint  measurement  can  be  applied  to  obtain  a  scale  V  which 
preserves  the  preference  order,  and  interval  scales  f  and  g  in  two  arguments  such  that 
V(x,  p;  y, q) = f(x,  p)+g(y,  q). 
The  key  axioms  used  to  derive  this  representation  are: 
Independence:  (x,p;  y,q)-(x,  p;  y'q')  iff (x',p';  y, q)(x',  p';  y',q'). 
Cancellation:  If  (x, p;  y'q')  (x',  p';  y, q)  and  (x',  p';  y", q")>(x",  p"; y', q'),  then  (x, p;  y", q")> 
(x", p"; y, q). 
Solvability:  If (x, p;  y, q)  (z,  r) -  (x, p;  y' q') for some  outcome  z and probability  r, then  there  exist 
y", q" such  that 
(x, p;  y"q") = (z,  r). 
It has  been  shown  that  these  conditions  are  sufficient  to  construct  the  desired  additive  represen- 
tation,  provided  the  preference  order  is  Archimedean  [8,25].  Furthermore,  since  (x, p;  y, q) 
(y, q; x, p),  f(x,  p) + g(y,  q) = f(y,  q) + g(x,  p),  and  letting  q = 0 yields  f  = g. 
Next,  consider  the  set  of all prospects  of the  form  (x, p) with  a single  non-zero  outcome.  In this case, 
the  bilinear  model  reduces  to  V(x,  p) =  rr(p)v(x).  This  is the  multiplicative  model,  investigated  in [351 
and  [25].  To  construct  the  multiplicative  representation  we  assume  that  the  ordering  of  the  prob- 
ability-outcome  pairs satisfies  independence,  cancellation,  solvability,  and the Archimedean  axiom.  In 
addition,  we  assume  sign  dependence  [25]  to  ensure  the  proper  multiplication  of  signs.  It should  be 
noted  that the solvability  axiom  used  in [35]  and [25]  must  be weakened  because  the probability  factor 
permits  only  bounded  solvability. 
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Combining the additive and the multiplicative representations yields 
V(x, p; y, q) = f[,r(p) v(x)]  + f[7rr(q)  v(y)]. 
Finally, we impose a new distributivity axiom: 
(x, p; y, p)  (z, p)  iff  (x, q; y, q)  -(z, q). 
Applying this axiom to the above representation, we obtain 
f[ir(p)v(x)]  +f[ir(p)v(y)]  = f[rr(p)v(z)] 
implies 
f[Li(q)v(x)] +f[L7(q)v(y)]  = f[r(q)v(z)]. 
Assuming,  with no loss of generality, that ir(q) < ir(p),  and letting a = 7r(p)v(x),  ,B  = ir(p)v(y), 
,y=  ir(p)v(z),  and  0=7i(q)/ir(p),  yields  f(a)+f(.8)=f(y)  implies  f(Oa)+f(O,8)=f(O9y)  for  all 
0<0<1. 
Because f  is strictly monotonic  we  can set  y = f '[f(a) +f(13)].  Hence,  Oy  = 0f  1[f(a)  +f(3)]  = 
F l[f(Oca)  +f(013)]. 
The  solution  to  this  functional  equation  is  f(a)  = kac  [1].  Hence,  V(x, p; y, q) = 
k[L(p)v(x)]c  + k[i(q)v(  y)]Y, for some k, c > 0. The desired bilinear form is obtained by redefining the 
scales  ir, v, and V so as to absorb the constants k and c. 
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